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The megatsunami of 26 December 2004 was the first tsunami with transoceanic impact since the
1960 Great Chilean and 1964 Great Alaskan tsunamis. Because of the distribution of deaths
among a large portion of the nations of the world, the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami is the first
universal natural disaster of modern times. For the purpose of adequate mitigation of future
tsunamis, it is important to understand which factors control most critically the final
characteristics of the flooding, namely runup and inundation. Their successful modeling requires
not only a credible database of inundation parameters, against which models can be tested
through numerical simulation of the generation, propagation to the local shores, and final
interaction of the tsunami with the target beaches, but also in situ observations that help identify
unusual impact and previously unrecognized or controversial flow patterns. Here, I comment on
the hydrodynamic lessons -mostly relearned- and describe remaining challenges.
Substantial progress in hydrodynamic science has been possible in the past fifteen years only
through tsunami field surveys that have driven the basic research (Synolakis and Bernard, 2006).
Field surveys have been instrumental in the development of models, as tsunami science evolved
differently from research in other extreme natural hazards - there had been no instrumental
recordings of tsunamis in the open ocean until recently. Before 2003, and the first ever real time
tsunami forecast (Titov et al, 2005a), science stood where earthquake science and engineering
were prior to the 1971 San Fernando, California earthquake. Tsunami engineering still does.
Field surveys have not only suggested a revisionism of the prevailing paradigm of leading
elevation waves, but also identified (as early as 1992) the deficiencies of the hydrodynamic
models of that time, leading the their substantial improvement (Synolakis and Okal, 2005). In
combination with large scale laboratory experiments (Liu et al, 1991, Yeh et al, 1996, Liu et al,
2005), field survey data sets have allowed for model verification - the process of examining how
well a particular approximation of the equations of motions models geophysical reality.
Synolakis (2006) summarizes quantitative field studies describing the impact of the megatsunami
in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, India, Sri Lanka, Oman, Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, the
Maldives, Rodrigues, Mauritius, and Reunion. In terms of a timeline, the very first survey
appears to have been that of Borrero (2005), in Banda Aceh, documented further by Borrero et al
(2006), as augmented with data from later surveys. These surveys identified extreme runup
>30m, extreme flow depths > 9m and extreme inundation distances >3km, earlier suspected for
extreme historic tsunamis, but with the exception of the 1946 event which produced runup >42m
in the steep cliffs of Scotts Cap, measurements of such a magnitude had never been documented
with modern methods for tectonic tsunamis. It is notable that coastal engineers and geophysicists

went to analogous extreme lengths to gather ephemeral data, e.g. the perilous survey of Fritz and
Borrero (2006a) in lawless Somalia.
The fortuitous availability of satellite altimetry recordings and satellite images have introduced a
new perpective (Geist et al, 2006a). The former, in the verification of the veracity of tsunami
generation and propagation models - before the megatsunami, the size and steepness of large
tsunamis in the open ocean was suspected and widely believed small, but never really proven so.
Model “validation” had only involved comparisons with tide gauge data, without ever
accounting for either the instrument response or its specific siting which significantly affects its
measurements. Tide gauges had been treated as seismometers, instruments with known and
standard response functions. Satellite images have helped not only plan the tsunami surveys, but
in conjunction with ground-truth measurements they have allowed for more comprehensive
damage assessments.
As Synolakis and Bernard (2006) have argued, a recurring question among all pre-2004 Sumatra
tsunami scientists has been what else could had been done from the basic science viewpoint to
have reduced the disaster. Given that the hazard had not been identified earlier, the
deconstructionism is mute. Had the hazard been known, engineering methods existed to have
produced inundation maps depicting possible flooding zones from a variant of the 2004 event,
everywhere across the Indian Ocean. After all, widely publishized simulations (Titov et al,
2005b) were rapidly prepared in the immediate aftermath, without even field measurements for
guidance, and eventually published with little changes (Titov et al, 2005b). Education campaigns
might had been undertaken to better acquaint people everywhere with what was a possible,
however unlikely, worst case flooding event. Even a crude tsunami warning without tsunameter
data might had been taken seriously. A far easier question is which specific lessons learned and
advances in our understanding of tsunamis might had helped reduced the impact.
I will thus summarize my perspective of what has been mostly relearned or just learned, in terms
of imagery, man made modifications to the coastal environment, the observations of the polarity
of the wave, the verification efforts of numerical models, the inferences from comparisons of the
2004 and 2005 tsunamis and the remarkable observations of impact in farfield ports hours after
the first tsunami arrival. This presentation follows closely Synolakis (2006).
The impact of photographs and videos of the advancing tsunami.
Possibly the most glaring surprise was the hundreds of pictures in Phuket of tourist just casually
watching the onslaught of the tsunami within 100m off the shoreline. Undoubtedly most
perished. The images of the aftermath were practically indistinguishable from photographs from
the fifteen events since 1992. The response of local residents and tourists in 2004 was
unfamiliar, at least for post 1998 tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean, where local residents are more
informed of tsunami hazards. Neither the pre-existing tsunami folklore, recorded in numerous
popular--science books since 1946, nor the telling Manzanillo pictures (Borrero et al, 1995) and
the change of the scientific paradigm for the leading wave of tsunamis (Tadepalli and Synolakis,
1994, 1996) had reached the wider public, worldwide. This is hardly surprising, given the reality
of late 20th century scientific discourse in coastal hydrodynamics, where few studies benefit
from the experience of others, the perennial wheel remains rediscovered. The focus has been on

moving forward rather than sideways, and coastal engineering remains one of the least cited
fields in ISI.
In addition to the photographs, there are numerous videos of the advancing megatsunami. For
perspective, the only movies that had been available of tsunami evolution on dry land were a
short clip of the 1946 tsunami, amateur footage showing the 1983 Japan Sea tsunami and a brief
footage of the Camana, Peru 2001 wave. The latter two have been filmed from far away and do
not depict the characteristics of the advancing wave well. By contrast, the videos of the
megatsunami in Aceh, Thailand, and Sri Lanka allow for more quantitative evaluation of the
moving tsunami front and underscore its debris flow nature, in contrast to videos from the
Maldives, where the tsunami manifests itself in a manner resembling riverine flooding.
Indeed, Borrero et al (2006) have described the velocity changes of the advancing wavefront as
inferred from an amateur video filmed near the center of Aceh, where the flow depth was 2.5m.
The team found the exact locations where the photograph stood during the tsunami attack. By
using particle image velocimetry techniques, and discarding parts of the video with active
zooming or photographer movement, they were able to infer that the moving front at first moved
at a speed of 2m/s, then suddenly accelerated to speeds > 5m/s. Whether this sudden increase is
due to a subsequent wave arrival or to a gravity--current type behaviour, where the main bulk of
the current is known to move faster than the leading edge, this remains to be explored.
Footage from Thailand shows the tsunami first slowing down as it evolves through increasingly
swallower water, then accelerating past the original shoreline. With hindsight, this should had
been anticipated, the wave slows down as the depth diminishes, but once on dry land it moves at
first with a velocity that is related to the bore propagation speed, before decelarating again as it
reaches its maximum runup. These inferences help explain the apparent mesmerization of
victims who are seen to simply stand watching the tsunami approaching - clearly its speed did
not appear too threatening, until it was way too late.
The effect of human modifications and poor land use to the severity of tsunami impact.
Less surprising as a concept, but not so in terms of impact, were the effects of human
modifications and poor land use in enhancing tsunami risk. By their very nature, long waves
were not supposed to be so exquisitely affected by features several order of magnitude smaller
than their wavelength. In one extreme tides flood indiscriminately of small--scale features, at the
other end, storm waves are very responsive to the these scales. Many tsunamis resemble a fast
receding and then fast moving tide, or vice versa, yet their interaction with coastlines resembles
more that of storm waves, particularly on gentle beaches.
The reef fronting the devastated El Transito during the Nicaraguan 1992 event had an opening to
allow for easier navigation, hence its rapid development as a fishing village. The adjacent Playa
Hermosa that was largely spared did not. During the 1993 tsunami at Aonae a manmade dune
and about 50 concrete wave protectors channeled the tsunami into the populated portions of the
town, while protecting the unpopulated areas. In Sri Lanka, the “Sumudra Devi”, a passenger
train out of Colombo, was derailed and overturned by the tsunami killing more than 1,000 (Liu et

al, 2005, Goff et al, 2006). In the immediate fronting area, significant coral mining had
occurred, related to tourism development (Fernando et al, 2005).
In Patong Beach, Thailand, a 60cm high seawall separating the beach from the road reduced
impact velocities. (Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005). Mangroves were observed to have protected
coastal communities in south--eastern India (Danielsen et al, 2005), while similar conclusions
have been drawn by Jackson et al (2005) in the Seychelles. In Thailand, mangroves previously
covered some 3,680 km2 in 1961, declining to only 2,400 in km2 by 2002. Chang et al (this
volume) combine satellite imagery of the impact in Thailand with data from VIEWS, a
laptop-based portable field data collection and visualization system for disaster reconnaissance
to collect geo-referenced damage observations and footage. They were able to correlate the
tsunami impact between adjacent sites - those protected by mangroves experienced damage of 5
in a 12 point scale, those “exposed” a 9, conclusions are consistent with Siripong’s (2006, this
volume.) It is clear that the effect of mangroves in reducing impact needs revisiting - earlier
laboratory experiments have been inconclusive, possibly due to scale effects, it is incredibly
difficult to scale frictional dissipation from small scale obstacles correctly. A concept so
intuitively obvious has not received the attention it deserves.
In the 1994 East Javan and 1996 Peruvian tsunamis it had been observed that coastal dunes
limited the amount of tsunami penetration, although, then, there had been no human settlements
to be impacted. In Karon Beach, Thailand, a low sand dune did protect the area behind it
(Dalrymple and Kriebel, 2005). In Yale, Sri Lanka a resort, for the purpose of better scenic
views, had removed some of the dune seaward of the hotel. The hotel was entirely razed to the
ground. Substantially larger water elevations and greater damage observations were found in the
hotel grounds as compared to neighboring areas, behind unaltered dunes. Earlier analytical work
was suggestive that in many cases the last topographic slope long waves encountered as they
attacked composite beaches affected the runup to first order, and it was further inferred that
other small scale features do so as well (Kanoglu and Synolakis, 1998).
Low lying coastlines as in Banda Aceh or Hambandotta, Sri Lanka have been known to be
particularly vulnerable to tsunami attacks. In the context of inundation mapping in California, it
had been observed that areas that get severely flooded during El Nino events, such as Seal Beach,
California feature the longest inundation distances when exposed to scenario tsunamis. Areas
where waves can attack from two sides are very prone to severe inundation, even from small
tsunamis, e.g, East Java 1994, and Peru, 1996. Despite the Boxing Day tsunami being the fifth to
hit Indonesia in 13 years, the population was unprepared and was decimated in the low lying
area between Banda Aceh and Longhka.
If the tsunami community appeared at first unprepared in the aftermath of the Boxing Day
tsunami, it was not due to the failure of paradigms, because of the unprecedented loss of life, the
worst possible surprise (Synolakis and Bernard, 2006).
The impact of well-distributed geographically tide gage recordings.
In terms of basic hydrodynamics, the megatsunami allowed for the validation of the model
proposed by Tadepalli and Synolakis (1994, 1996) for the leading wave of tsunamis. By

considering a step-function type seafloor rupture over constant depth, they had suggested that the
leading wave of a tsunami striking the adjacent coastline would cause the shoreline to retreat,
naming in a leading elevation N-wave or LDN. The wave propagating off the uplifting part
would be a leading elevation N-wave or LEN. This model that remained controversial for quite
awhile in the middle 90s. To wit, senior scientists had publicly disputed the existence of the
LDN waves by dismissing historic observations as folklore - this was just two months before the
Manzanillo tsunami and the now famous photograph of the bay emptying taken as the tsunami
arrived. The latter had been the only photographic evidence of the LDN. The controversy was
due to the lack of quantitative free field tsunami data - earlier hydrodynamic analysis had
assumed much steeper “tsunamis” than those that occur in nature. Eyewitness accounts east of
the rupture in Aceh, Malaysia and Thailand have confirmed the first arrival as an LDN, while on
the west in India, Sri Lanka, Africa and the IO islands, the megatsunami was noticed mostly as
an LEN. Tide gage records have confirmed the eyewitness accounts, refer to figure 1.

Figure 1. Comparison of the normalized
run-up of N waves with predictions from
asymptotic results and integral expressions.
The data points indicate evaluations of the
solution integrals for different beach slopes,
the solid line the asymptotic prediction
shown in the abscissa. The inset(upper left)
shows the profile of a leading-depression
N-wave (LDN), the inset on the lower right,
a leading elevation N-wave (LEN). ε is a
scaling parameter to allow comparison with
solitary waves of the same height H and
wavenumber γ. α-β is the distance between
crest and trough. The solitary wave profile is
also shown superposed on the N-waves in
each inset. After Tadepalli and Synolakis
(1994). The inset on the upper right shows
tide gauge records in Male and Phuket, after
Satake (2005). The 2004 Boxing day
tsunami is seen to manifest itself as an LDN
in Phuket, as elsewhere east of the
subduction zone, and as an LEN in Male,
west of the subduction zone.

The impact of satellite altimetry measurements.
Hydrodynamic propagation models are initialized with seafloor displacement estimates derived
from fault solutions. Their predictions reflect the accuracy of standard elastic half-space models
used to transfer fault solutions to displacement fields. Model initialization had been partially
validated with smaller tsunamis, but never with megathrust events. The current state-of-the-art
hydrodynamic propagation engineering codes appear to model tsunami propagation adequately.

Figure 2 Smith et al (2005)’s comparisons of tsunami free-field signatures from satellite backscatter data with the
predictions of the model MOST, believed to be the first of this kind.

Figure 2 from Smith et al (2005) compares tsunami free-field signatures from satellite
backscatter data with model predictions from MOST (Titov and Synolakis, 1998), the first ever
such comparison. Note the <60cm height of the tsunami as it propagates and the small steepness,
which confirms the conjecture that led to the development of the LDN/LEN paradigm (Tadepalli
and Synolakis, 1996). These comparisons suggest confidence in the models that had been used to
estimate the impact of other megathrusts, such as Cascadia.
Newly identified “phenomena”.
There have been four noteworthy phenomena not as obvious in earlier tsunamis. One, the sparing
of the Maldives, an archipelago with coral atolls which rise to no more than 2m (at best) from
mean water level. The islands rise from the seafloor as pillared structures, and there was no
significant wave amplification (Synolakis et al, 2005, Fritz et al, 2006b)While the reef fronting
the islands determined the extend of inundation, there is little question that the Maldives
experienced a tsunami with heights closer to the free field tsunami height. A similar conclusion
can be drawnn from the impact in Diego Garcia (Synolakis, 2006). While not explicit, this
behavior was implicit in Kanoglu & Synolakis (1998).
Two, the wave--guide type effect from mid--Ocean ridges, that appears to have funneled the
megatsunami away from the tip of Africa (Titov et al, 2005b). The simulation, not only
confirmed the analysis of Ben Menahem and Rosenman (1972) as to the directivity of a rupturing
source, but also the overall accuracy of hydrodynamic models in terms of arrival times and
quantitative propagation.

Figure 3 Titov et al (2005b)’s comparisons of the maximum megatsunami height as it propagated around the world,
using the model MOST. The white lines are isochrones, lines of equal propagation time. The color chart shows the
tsunami height, with dark red 60cm and yellow 20cm. The inset on the left the composite fault model used in the
simulation. The inset on the right Okal’s (pers. comm.) calculation of the directivity patterns of a long megatsunami
source, as eventually accepted, and from a shorter source, as initially proposed. This figure was originally used to
bolster the hypothesis of a longer rupture, and the simple radiation pattern of a long source is seen to agree with
Titov et al’s (2005b) detailed computations.

Three, the comparison between the 26 December 2004 and 28 March 2005 tsunamis allowed for
the quantitative evaluation of the utility of relying on coastal gages. The 2005 tsunami was very
small, a “no show” (Kerr, 2005), yet it was triggered by a magnitude 8.7 thrust earthquake,
“with similar focal mechanisms, focal depths, and epicenters only about 110 km apart” from the
megatsunami source, Geist et al (2006b). The latter have published a comparison of maximum
wave height measurements as recorded in tide gages in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Cocos
Island, as shown in table 1. While the former values are up to five times larger, if one relied on
the measurement from the Cocos Island tide gage, one would infer that the 2005 tsunami was
about one-half the size of the 2004 wave. Indeed, there was massive panic in several nations in
the Indian Ocean, and the Cocos Island recording did not help cancel the evacuations or better
focus the warnings The tide gage in Manzanillo Mexico recorded the 2004 tsunami as 2.8m high,
as big as the Colombo, Sri Lanka station. Without belaboring the obvious further, the
observations underscore the risk of relying on tide gage records for warming guidance. Tide gage
measurements are known to be affected by harbor resonance (Raichlen, 1966, Synolakis, 2002).
The only proven methodology for inferring the free field height of a tsunami is using tsunameters
(Titov et al, 2005a).

Station

26 Dec 2004

28 Mar 2005

Ratio

Colombo. Sri Lanka

> 2.7m

0.5m

>5.4

Hanimaadhoo, Maldives

2.2m

0.4m

5.5

Male, Maldives

2.1m

0.2m

10.5

Gan, Maldives

1.4m

0.3m

4.7

Cocos Island, Australia

0.5m

0.2m

2.5

Table 1. Comparison of tide gage maximum height recordings for two tsunamis, the 26 December 2004
megatsunami and the no-show tsunami of 28 March 2005, after Geist et al (2006b).

Geist et al (2006b) have attributed primarily the nanosize of the 2005 tsunami to the smaller
ocean depth over the deformation zone. By contrast Arcas and Synolakis (Kerr, 2005) have
argued since most of the deformation occurred below the islands of Nias and Simeulue, the
effective water mass set into motion during the 2005 event was reduced, thereby drastically
limiting the size and impact of the generated tsunami. Regardless, this controversy underscores
the need for pre-existing inundation maps for realistic scenario events, so earlier unrecognized
effects such as the presence of islands in the deformation zone can be properly evaluated in
advance.

Figure 4. Calculations of the hydrodynamic propagation of the 28 March 2005 event. after Arcas and Synolakis as
reported by Kerr (2005). On the left, with the islands of Nias and Simeuleue removed, on the right with the islands
in place. The color scale on the right depicts wave heights in cm.

Hydrodynamic observations in Ports in the Indian Ocean from the 2004 tsunami.
The port of Salalah is one of the major container terminal facilities in the Middle East. Okal et al
(2006b) report that the 285m freighter Maersk Mandraki, broke her moorings at 1:42 p.m, and

drifted for several hours, both outside and inside the harbor, caught in eddies - all efforts to free
her with tug boats were in vain-eventually settled outside the harbor. Similarly, the 292m long
Maersk Virginia, comparable to Mandraki, was rocked by the tsunami and had to wait about 7hrs
outside. During that time Virginia was getting pulled towards the breakwater, striking it
eventually. Miraculously, Mandraki did not collide with other ships or harbor structures. It is
interesting to note that the runup in area surrounding the port was less than 1m, underscoring the
substantial impact that even small tsunamis can have in modern ports.
A similar observation was made in the port of Toamasina, Madagascar by Okal et al (2006a). At
the time of first tsunami arrival, around 12:30pm, the runup locally didn’t exceed 60cm. Yet,
around 7:00pm, a 50m freighter broke its moorings, and wondered within the harbor for the next
3hrs, eventually being grounded on sand bar. Okal et al (2006c) also descrive how the MSC
Uruguay, anchored in Le Port in east Reunion broke its mooring 4hr later than the first arrival,
This delay could be attributed to harbor resonance whose onset is triggered by the arrival of
waves with periods close to those of the port, and not necessarily by the first wave.
Eskijian (2006) has reported on the damage in Ports in Chennai on the mainland and Port Blair in
the South Andaman island. Chennai had no prior warning, no action plan and was totally
unprepared. By contrast, in Port Blair, the protocol was that if an earthquake occurred, all vessels
were required to leave the port, as soon as possible. Most vessels were able to depart, and there
was little damage to the port infrastructure, as a direct result of the tsunami. The tsunami arrived
in Chennai 1hr 25min after hitting Port Blair. Eskijian (2006) speculated that the satellite dish
had been rotated due to the earthquake and communications with INSAT 3C lost. Synolakis
(2005) has argued that because of the damage to a navy facility, some communications are
known to have survived, and that it remains unfathomable that there was no warning issued for
the mainland or Sri Lanka. Thousands of people might have been saved, as there was sufficient
time of more than 90min to allow for evacuations of the most populous coastlines.
The impact of smaller tsunamis on ports remains highly controversial. Borrero et al (2005) have
reported on possible impacts in the Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach, California from a
locally-triggered tsunami of size larger than observed in most IO ports. Their estimates of the
economic impact have been scrutinized, in letters to the editor. Nonetheless, the Ports are
re-evaluating their emergency preparedness practices, and not a moment too soon, given the
observations in the Indian Ocean.
What remains to be done.
What remains in terms of emergency management and warning is discussed by Bernard et al
(2006). Clearly tsunameter measurements are not only needed for real time forecasting and
warning, but also to quantify what is still an inexact science in terms tsunami magnitude scales.
The 1+1 and 2+1 tsunami wave evolution is by now well understood, with uncertainties arising
only from the seafloor-water wave motion coupling that initializes the models and the correct
choice of model.
One, tsunami numerical models must continue to improve through a combination of testing with
benchmark laboratory data, instrumental tsunameter recordings, and field inundation

measurements. Specific emphasis needs to be given to the seafloor/wave interaction. There is still
little understanding of the dynamics of submarine mass movements, with some claiming speeds
of over 100m/s on the seafloor. Differentiation is needed between research and operational
modeling, and hopefully eventually there will not need to be. Until then, validation standards
urgently need to be established, there is now more than ever greater risk of over--reaction than
vice-versa.
Two, the forces on structures need to be better understood, particularly since tsunami floods are
often debris floods. Existing methodologies are based on riverine flooding results, and there is
little understanding of impulsive or impact loads of small duration. Given the survival of places
of worship, and their likely use as shelters in the future, whether planned or not, comprehensive
simulations need to establish how safe they really are.
Three, the shortcomings in the population and emergency response observed underscore the
urgent need for a worldwide educational effort on tsunami hazards mitigation. Even in 2006,
earthquakes in Tonga and off Kythira island, Greece produced strong ground shaking but did not
trigger spontaneous evacuations, as the residents were expecting official warnings. At best,
official warnings would had arrived in adjacent coastlines after the first tsunami arrival. Further,
simply educating local populations at risk is not enough. In an era of global citizenship, it is
important that everyone can identify the precursors of a tsunami attack and knows to evacuate to
high ground or inland as quickly as possible, and if not, how to more safely vertically evacuate to
well--built surviving structures.
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